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1. See among many authors on this controversial issue, F. de Martens, Traité
de droit international, vol. 1 202, 212 (Chevalier-Marescq 1883); J. Basdevant,
Hugo Grotius, in Les fondateurs du droit international 125, at 127 (A. Pillet ed.,
Giard & Brière 1904); L.F.L. Oppenheim, International Law—A Treatise, vol. 1,
Peace 58 (Green Longmans ed, London 1905); W. Van der Vlugt, L’Œuvre de
Grotius et son influence sur le développement du droit international, 7 R.C.A.D.I.
395, at 444–45 (1925); J.B. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law—
Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations 281 ff.  (Clarendon Press 1934); M.
Bourquin, Grotius est-il le père du droit des gens?, in Grandes Figures et grandes
Œuvres juridiques 77 (Librairie de L’Université 1948); J.L. Brierly, The Law of
Nations—An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 28 (Clarendon Press
6th ed. 1963); P. Haggenmacher, La place de Francisco de Vitoria parmi les
fondateurs du droit international, in Actualité de la pensée juridique de Francisco
de Vitoria 27 (A. Truylol Serra et al. eds., Bryulant 1988); Y. Onuma, When was
the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of International
Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. History Int’l L. 1, at 5 (2000).
2. Bentham introduced the expression in his influential book, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Pickering 1823).  See
also M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law,” 78
American J. Int’l L. 405 (1984); M.S. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law:
Hobbes and Grotius, in Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya 391, at 395 n.9 (R.St.J.
Macdonald ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1994) (stating that Bentham invented the
expression international law “in a fit of new legal definitions”).  It is interesting
to point out that Bentham was no fan of Vattel, about whom he is deemed to have
said:  “Vattel’s propositions are most old-womanish and tautological;” see the
citation reproduced in E. Nys, Notes inédites de Bentham sur le droit
international, 1 L.Q. Rev. 225, at 230 (1885).
3. See P. Guggenheim, Emer de Vattel et l’étude des relations internationales
en Suisse 23 (Librairie de l’Université 1956), who noted the following about Vattel:
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I.  INTRODUCTION
There is a continuing debate among international commentators
as to the doctrinal “paternity” of international law,1 which must be
distinguished from the expression’s etymological origin, credited to
the British author Jeremy Bentham.2  But be it the Spanish Francisco
de Vitoria, the Dutch Hugo Grotius, or the Swiss Emer de Vattel
who is deemed the “father” of the discipline, there can be little doubt
that the latter’s contribution was seminal,3 with his masterpiece Le
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“Pourtant, sa contribution au développement du droit international ne saurait être
sous-estimée.”  See also E. Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinale du
droit international classique 421 (Pedone 1998) (“Aussi bien, ceux que l’on a
longtemps considéré comme les pères du droit international, que ce soient Grotius
ou Pufendorf, Barbeyrac ou Burlamaqui, Rachel ou Textor, ne le sont que de
manière indirecte et secondaire alors même que cette paternité longtemps
controversée revient sans hésitation, selon nous, à Wolff puis Vattel.”).
4. On the publishing history of Droit des Gens, see A. de Lapradelle, Emer
de Vattel, in The Classics of International Law—Vattel, vol. 1, i, at lvi–lix  (J.B.
Scott ed., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) and A. Mallarmé, Emer de
Vattel, in Les fondateurs du droit international 481, at 488–90 (A. Pillet ed., Giard
& Brière 1904).  The version used here is the original London one, E. de Vattel, Le
Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite & aux
affaires des Nations & des Souverains, 2 vols. (London 1758)  [hereinafter Droit
des Gens].  The English translation utilized is that by J. Chitty, The Law of Nations;
or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations
and Sovereigns (Johnson Law Booksellers 1863) [hereinafter Law of Nations].
5. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at vii.
6. Vattel added: 
The greater part of mankind have, therefore, only a vague, a very
incomplete, and often even a false notion of it.  The generality of
writers, and even celebrated authors, almost exclusively confine the
name of ‘Law of Nations’ to certain maxims and treatises recognised
among nations, and which the mutual consent of the parties has
rendered obligatory on them.  This is confining within very narrow
bounds a law so extensive in its own nature, and in which the whole
human race are so intimately concerned; it is, at the same time, a
degradation of that law, in consequence of a misconception of its real
origin . . . .” 
See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at vii.
7. See P. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 12, who wrote:  
L’ouvrage de Vattel était destiné aux hommes d’Etats et aux
diplomates, en un mot aux professionnels des affaires étrangères.  Il ne
devait pas seulement leur ‘dire’ le droit;  l’ambition de Vattel allait plus
loin:  il se flattait d’exercer une influence sur les hommes d’Etat et de
les amener à respecter ce droit international dont trop souvent ils font
fi.
8. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at xvi.  At the beginning of the second
Livre, Vattel reiterated that he writes for the conductors of states:  
[a]nd why should we not hope still to find, among those who are at the
head of affairs, some wise individuals who are convinced of this great
Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la
conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains.4
At the outset of this two-volume manuscript, Vattel identified the
mission ahead in the following terms:  “The Law of Nations, though
so noble and important a subject, has not, hitherto, been treated with
all the care it deserves.”5  Droit des Gens was meant to remedy this
shortcoming.6  The targeted audience was also explicitly set out in
the preface7—“The law of nations is the law of sovereigns.  It is
principally for them and for their ministers, that it ought to be
written.”8  Even though every citizen may be interested in it, it is the
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truth, that virtue is, even for sovereigns and political bodies, the most
certain road to prosperity and happiness?  There is at least one benefit
to be expected from the open assertion and publication of sound
maxims, which is, that even those who relish them the least are thereby
laid under a necessity of keeping within some bounds, lest they should
forfeit their characters altogether. To flatter ourselves with the vain
expectation that men, and especially men in power, will be inclined
strictly to conform to the laws of nature, would be a gross mistake; and
to renounce all hope of making impression on some of them, would be
to give up mankind for lost . . . .  
See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 134.  Finally, see Law of Nations, supra note
4, at 500.
9. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at xvi.
10. Id.  In Chitty’s translation, the question mark is mistaken for an
exclamation mark.  See Droit des Gens, vol. 1, supra note 4, at xxiii:  “quels fruits
ne pourrait-on attendre d’un bon Traité du Droit des Gens?” (spelling modernized)
See A. Mallarmé, supra note 4, at 582, who wrote about Droit des Gens that, “il est
un manuel de politique, une encyclopédie pratique et positive à l’usage des hommes
publics.” (emphasis added).
11. The number of editions and translations of Droit des Gens provides a good
indication of the great success and influence of Vattel.  Between 1758 and 1863,
there were twenty editions of the work in its original language, French.  In Great
Britain, there were ten English translations between 1759 and 1834; in the United
States of America, there were eighteen translations or reprints of translations
between 1796 and 1872.  His manuscript was also translated into Spanish (six
between 1820 and 1836), German (1760) and Italian (1805).  See J.B. Scott , The
Classics of International Law—Vattel, vol. 1 at lviii–lix (Carnegie Institution of
Washington 1916).
12. H. Lauterpacht, Les travaux préparatoires et l’interprétatoin des traités,
18 R.C.A.D.I. 709, at 713 (1927); author’s translation of “pas d’auteur dont le nom
ait été plus fréquemment mentionné devant les tribunaux internationaux que
Vattel.”
13. G. Von Glahn, Law among Nations—An Introduction to Public
persons entrusted with public affairs who should “apply seriously to
the study of a science which ought to be their law, and, as it were,
the compass by which to steer their course;”9 and if they did, Vattel
added, “what happy effects might we not expect from a good treatise
on the law of nations[?]”10
History shows that Droit des Gens did obtain such effects on
international law and on the people conducting international affairs,
not only in Europe but also in the newly formed United States of
America.11  Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that in the 19th century, there
was “no author whose name had been more frequently mentioned
before international law courts than Vattel’s.”12  Gerhard von Glahn,
for his part, opined thus:  “It can seriously be maintained that despite
the vital contribution of Grotius, no single writer has exercised as
much direct and lasting influence on the men engaged in the conduct
of international affairs in the legal sphere, at least until very modern
times, as did Vattel.”13
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International Law 44 (3d ed. Macmillan 1976).  It is also interesting to point out
that even Vattel’s critics agreed that Droit des Gens received a phenomenal success.
See, for instance, C. Van Vollenhoven, The Three Stages in the Evolution of the
Law of Nations 32 (Martinus Nijhoff 1919).  See also C. Van Vollenhoven, Du
droit de paix—De iure pacis 98–99 (Martinus Nijhoff 1932).  Other negative
assessments of Vattel’s work were made by A.G. Heffter, Le droit international de
l’Europe 34 (4th ed.  Cotillon 1883); F. von Martens, supra note 1, at 211–12; W.
Van der Vlugt, supra note 1, at 467; J.L. Brierly, supra note 1, at 40.
14. See A. de Lapradelle, supra note 4, at xxvii–xlii, who provided a good
summary of the information pertaining to the reception and authority of Droit des
Gens in Great Britain and in the United States of America during the 18th and 19th
centuries.  See also T. Ruyssen, Les sources doctrinales de l’internationalisme, vol.
2, De la Paix de Westphalie à la Révolution française 514–15 (Presses
universitaires de France 1957); P. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 15–16; E.
Jouannet, supra note 3, at 14–15.
15. This idea of ‘shared consciousness of humanity’ is borrowed from the
moral philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in particular from G.W.F.
Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes §§ 632–71 (Meiner 1952) (1807); see also
G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 383–409 (A.V. Miller trans., Clarendon
1977).
16. The idea of ‘consciousness’ associated with an ensemble of human beings
was suggested by G. Butler, Sovereignty and the League of Nations, 1 British Y.B.
Int’l L. 35, at 42 (1920–21), who discussed the word sovereignty, and more
particularly the expression ‘external sovereignty,’ by resorting, inter alia, to
insights from the new field of psychology.  See also P. Allott, Reconstituting
Humanity—New International Law, 3 European J. Int’l L. 219, at 223 (1992), who
expressed the following view:  
Society exists nowhere else than in the human mind.  And the
constitution of a given society exists in and of human consciousness,
the consciousness of those conceived as its members and its non-
members, past and present.  Wherever and whenever a structure-
system of human socializing is so conceived in consciousness, there
and then a society is conceived—family, tribe, organized religion, legal
corporation, nation, state . . .   
(emphasis added).
II.  VATTEL AND THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA
This unprecedented success of Droit des Gens, especially in
Great Britain and the United States of America,14 bears witness to
the undeniable impact Vattel’s writing has had on the shared
consciousness of society,15 including those of the international
society and the American political, legal and diplomatic societies.16
Part II, Section C of this paper will explore Vattel’s theory on the
question of territory transfers in international law, and Part II,
Section D will discuss whether or not the cession of Louisiana to the
United States followed the conditions prescribed in Droit des Gens.
The conclusion will examine why, unlike in many other instances,
Vattel’s doctrine was absent in the debate over the purchase of
Louisiana.
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17. See A. Mallarmé, supra note 4, at 591.
18. J. Bodin, Les six Livres de la Republique (Iacques du Puys 1583) (1576).
See also  J. Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale (R. Knolles trans, Impensis
G. Bishop 1606).
19. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 1.
20. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at lv.
21. But see P.P. Remec, The Position of the Individual in International Law
According to Grotius and Vattel 172 (Martinus Nijhoff 1960), who pointed out that
the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ are not always used in Droit des Gens to convey the
same idea:  “Yet it appears from other places that he [Vattel] understands under the
A.  Vattel on territory transfers
In order to appreciate Vattel’s views on the transfers of territory,
one must have a sense of his work as a whole.  Therefore, the
principal themes in Droit des Gens will first be presented in Part II,
Section B, before examining in detail in Part II, Section C the part of
the manuscript dealing with the question of territory transfers.
B.  Droit des Gens in general
In its original format, Droit des Gens had:  (i) a preface, in which
Vattel explained why he wrote the book and the guiding principles he
intended to follow; (ii) preliminaries, which brushed a general picture
of the main ideas of the law of nations; and, (iii) four books, which
constituted the body of the manuscript—the first book on the nation
in itself, the second one on the nation and its relation with others, the
third one on war, and the last book on peace and embassies.17  The
most important achievement of Vattel is the externalisation of the
idea of ‘sovereignty,’ which was transposed form the internal plane
to the international plane.
The intention to externalise ‘sovereignty’—which internal
ramifications were developed by Jean Bodin in Les six Livres de la
Republique18—is manifested in the very first book of Droit des Gens,
entitled “Of Nations Considered in Themselves.”19  It provides the
following definition of the state:
NATIONS or states are bodies politic, societies of men united
together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and
advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength.
Such a society has her affairs and her interests; she
deliberates and takes resolutions in common; thus becoming
a moral person, who possesses an understanding and a will
peculiar to herself, and is susceptible of obligations and
rights.20
Such a definition of ‘state’ or ‘nation’—terms which Vattel used
interchangeably and viewed as synonymous21—is based on the ideas
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term ‘Nation’ the body of the people united through the civil compact, while ‘State’
would refer more to the political organization of that body as the system in which
the Nation chose to function in order to achieve its end.” (footnotes omitted).
22. Also referred to as “social compact.”  See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at
lv–lvi: 
Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and
who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the
state of nature,—Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as
so many free persons living together in the state of nature.  It is a
settled point with writers on the natural law, that all men inherit from
nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot be
deprived without their own consent.  In a State, the individual citizens
do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have made a
partial surrender of them to the sovereign.  But the body of the nation,
the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all
other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily
submitted to them.
23. On this, Vattel further wrote: 
[t]hat society, considered as a moral person, since possessed of an
understanding, volition, and strength peculiar to itself, is therefore
obliged to live on the same terms with other societies or states, as
individual man was obliged, before those establishments, to live with
other men, that is to say, according to the laws of the natural society
established among the human race, with the difference only of such
exceptions as may arise from the different nature of the subjects . . . 
See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at lx (emphasis added).
24. See generally, O. Beaud, La notion d’État, 35 Archives Philo. D. 119, 125
ff (1990).
25. See A. Mallarmé, supra note 4, at 509; see also C. Phillipson, Emerich de
Vattel, in Great Jurists of the World, vol. 2, 477 at 496 (J. Macdonell & E. Manson
eds., Littre, Brown 1914).
26. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 1.
27. Id.
of “social contract”22 and “moral person.”23  And, most importantly,
it would require the recognition of some kind of competence to
govern, that is, of some kind of ‘sovereignty.’24
Indeed, the public body at the head of such a society of persons
coming together to protect shared interests and pursue common
goals must have the power to provide order and to rule.25  “This
political authority is the Sovereignty,” wrote Vattel, “and he or they
who are invested with it are the Sovereign.”26  He further explained
thus:
It is evident, that, by the very act of the civil or political
association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of
the entire body, in every thing that relates to the common
welfare.  The authority of all over each member, therefore,
essentially belongs to the body politic, or state; but the
exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands,
according as the society may have ordained.27
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28. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 1, 52:  
That moral person resides in those who are invested with the public
authority, and represent the entire nation.  Whether this be the common
council of the nations, an aristocratic body, or a monarch, this
conductor and representative of the nation, this sovereign, of whatever
kind, is therefore indispensably obliged to procure all the knowledge
and information necessary to govern well, and to acquire the practice
and habit of all the virtues suitable to a sovereign.
29. So Vattel followed the same classification of forms of government used by
Bodin; he did not refer to Montesquieu’s new classification of governments as
republics, monarchies, and despotisms, introduced in C.-L. de S. Montesquieu, De
l’esprit des loix (London 1757) (1748).
30. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 1.
31. See E. Jouannet, supra note 3, at 404, who wrote:  
Que Vattel, ensuite, ait ainsi théorisé la notion de souveraineté externe
n’empêche pas qu’il ait perçu tout aussi nettement la notion de
souveraineté interne, il commence d’ailleurs son grand ouvrage, au
livre I, par une théorisation très poussée à l’égard de la souveraineté
interne avant de l’envisager, aux livres suivants, comme pilier de sa
construction internationale.  On ne veut pas dire non plus que l’on a
affaire à deux notions réellement différentes puisqu’il ne s’agit en
définitive que des deux faces opposées d’un même concept. 
(emphasis added).
32. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 2.
Depending on the locus of power, the moral person in whose hands
the authority is placed constitutes a democracy, an aristocracy or a
monarchy and,28 Vattel opined,29 these “three kinds of government
may be variously combined and modified.”30
Then, the association between ‘sovereignty’ and internal
governance was transposed onto the international plane.31  This
externalisation of the competence to govern was carried out by
establishing what constitutes ‘sovereignty,’ this time viewed from
without: 
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever,
without dependence on any foreign power, is a Sovereign
State.  Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other
state.  Such are the moral persons who live together in a
natural society, subject to the law of nations.  To give a nation
a right to make an immediate figure in this grand society, it
is sufficient that it be really sovereign and independent, that
is, that it govern [sic] itself by its own authority and laws.32
It is clear that Vattel has here changed the idea of ‘sovereignty’—the
authority to govern is now seen as vested into a political body acting
as the sole representative of the people both internally and externally.
The proposition that a society is not merely the sum of persons
forming it, but ought to be viewed in terms of an aggregate of
individuals—that is, of a corporate body, having its own will and its
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33. See P.P. Remec, supra note 21, at 166.
34. See R. Pound,  Philosophical Theory and International Law, 1 Bibliotheca
Visseriana 71, at 79 (1923):  
To Plato the city-state was an individual and the characteristics of the
individual human soul projected themselves enlarged in the
physiognomy of the state.  He was not thinking of a moral order among
states but of a moral order within the city-state.  But the transition in
thought was easy and led to ready acceptance of the juristic dogmatic
fiction that treated the mass of a population collectively as the
equivalent in moral responsibility of an individual man.  
See also A.P. d’Entrèves, Natural Law—An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 10
(Hutchinson 1951).
35. On the influence of Roman law in the development of international law
concepts, see H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International
Law (With Special Reference to International Arbitration) 23–25 (Longmans,
Green 1927).
36. J. Althusius, Politica methodice digesta et exemplis sacris et profanis
illustrata (Corvin 1603).  The importance of Althusius theory was brought up by O.
Gierke, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien
(Koebner 1880).  See also E. Jouannet, supra note 3, at 265.
37. Hobbes’s Leviathan is said to be “the greatest, perhaps the sole, master-
piece of political philosophy written in the English language . . .”  See M.
Oakeshott, Introduction, in T. Hobbes, Leviathan viii (Basil Blackwell 1946).  See
also F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty 141 (2d ed. Cambridge University Press 1986).
38. See, among many authors on this aspect of Hobbes’s work, C.B.
Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism—Hobbes to Locke
17–29 (Clarendon Press 1964); A. Clair, Aliénation de droits et institution de l’Etat
selon Hobbes, 25 Archives Phil. D. 305 (1980); D. Copp, Hobbes on Artificial
Persons and Collective Actions, 89 Philosophical Rev. 579 (1980); S. Goyard-
Fabre, Le concept de ‘persona civilis’ dans la philosophie politique de Hobbes, 3
Cahiers Phil. Pol. & Jur. 51 (1983); L. Jaume, La théorie de la ‘personne fictive’
dans le Léviathan de Hobbes, 33 Rev. française sc. pol. 1009 (1983); D. Gauthier,
Hobbes’s Social Contrat, 22 Noûs 71 (1988); F. Tinland, Droit naturel, loi civile
et souveraineté à l’époque classique 123–57 (Presse universitaires de France 1988);
S. Goyard-Fabre, Loi civile et obéissance dans l’Etat-Léviathan, in Thomas Hobbes
—Philosophie première, théorie de la science et politique 289 (Y.C. Zarka & J.
Bernhardt eds., Presses universitaires de France 1990); L. Stephen, Hobbes 182–95
(Thoemmes Antiquarian 1991); A. Ryan, Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, in The
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes 208 (T. Sorell ed.,  Cambridge University Press
1996); E. Jouannet, supra note 3, at 265 ff.
39. T. Hobbes of Malmesbury, Elementa philosophica de cive (Amsterdam
own finality—predates Vattel.33  According to Roscoe Pound, the
personification of the state can be traced back to Ancient Greece and
would be as old as Plato’s Republic.34  Although picked up by the
Roman private civil law, it was only in the Middle Ages that the
concept of fictitious juridical person resurfaced, initially in domestic
public law and then in international law.35
The first reappearance of the doctrine was with the work of
Johannes Althusius, who published Politica36 in 1603.  But it is
Thomas Hobbes37 who is credited with the medieval rebirth of the
theory of moral personality,38 hinted at in De Cive,39 and firmly
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1647) (1642).
40. T. Hobbes of Malmesbury, Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of
a Common-Wealth—Ecclesiasticall and Civil (Green Dragon 1651).
41. Id. at 80–83 (spelling modernized).
42. See generally, Michel Villey, Les fondateurs de l’école du droit naturel
moderne au XVIIe siècle, 6 Archives Phil. D. 73, 84–90 (1961); A. Renaut,
Pufendorf Samuel, 1632–1693—Le Droit de la nature et des gens, 1672, in
Dictionnaire des Œuvres Politiques 659 (F. Chatelet, O. Duhamel & E. Pisier eds.,
Presses universitaires de France, 1986).
43. Samuelix Pufendorfsi, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (Hoogenhuysen
1688).  See also the French translation from the notes of J. Barbeyrac, S. von
Pufendorf, Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens, ou Système Générale des Principes
les plus importants de la Morale, de la Jurisprudence et de la Politique, 2 vols.
(Kuyper 1706) and the English translation by C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather, S.
von Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations (2nd ed.) (Clarendon Press
1934).
44. See Otto von Gierke, The Development of Political Theory 175 ff. (Fertig
1966); Paul Guggenheim, La souveraineté dans l’histoire du droit des gens — De
Vitoria à Vattel, in Mélanges offerts à Juraj Andrassy 111, at 119 (Nijhorff 1968);
P.P. Remec, supra note 21, at 163, 170.
45. See Alfred Dufour, Tradition et modernité de la conception pufendorfienne
de l’État, 21 Archives Philo. D. 55, at 66–67 (1976); Jouannet, supra note 3, at
286–95.
46. Remec, supra note 21, at 169.
47. See, among others, Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 120–21; Jouannet, supra
note 3, at 255, 311–16.  See also P. Haggenmacher, L’État souverain comme sujet
de droit international, de Vitoria à Vattel, 16 Droits 11, at 20 (1992):  
Mais c’est seulement au siècle suivant [18th century] que la qualité de
sujet du droit international finit par être théorisée à l’aide de la personne
étatique souveraine, entraînant un effacement relatif du problème de la
compétence de guerre et du belligérant souverain.  Les artisans de cette
reformulation sont Wolff et Vattel qui, tout en rendant hommage au
prince souverain devenu entre-temps despote éclairé, font de l’Etat
souverain le principe structurel décisif de leurs traités sur le droit des
gens.
48. Wolff simply assimilated states to individuals, without explaining the
established in Leviathan40 with the notion of “artificial person.”41
Samuel von Pufendorf42 further developed the theory of juristic
person—what he called persona moralis composita —in his De Iure
Naturae et Gentium,43 first published in 1672, which discussed the
dissociation of the moral person of the state from the physical person
of the ruler.44  In fact, he suggested a doctrine of double contracts—
one among the individuals of the society and one between this social
body and the political body, which is the corporate body of the
nation.45
Although it had already resurfaced in the 18th century, it is
accurate to say that, “[a]t the time of Vattel no clearcut theory of
moral personality was widely accepted.”46  In fact, Albert de
Lapradelle argued that it is really only with Vattel—some say47 along
with Christian Wolff48—that the personality and authority of the ruler
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juristic personality of the former.  See Christian Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated
According to a Scientific Method — In which Natural Law of Nations is carefully
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individual free persons living in a state of nature, nations also must be regarded in
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the original Christian Wolff, Ius gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum.  In quo
ius gentium naturale ab eo, quod voluntarii pactitii, et consuetudinarii est, accurate
distincguitur 1 (Frankfurt & Leipzig 1764).  Wolff first made reference to the state
as a “person” in Christian Wolff, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, in quibus
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533 (Officina Rengeriana 1754).
49. Lapradelle, supra note 4, at x:  Pour la première fois, la personalité et la
souveraineté de l’Etat (§§ 3–4) se substituent à la personalité et à la souveraineté
du prince.”  See also Guggenheim, supra note 47, at 119–21; Jouannet, supra note
3, at 404.
50. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 13–14.
51. See Phillipson, supra note 25, at 497–98.
52. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 12.
become the personality and authority of the state, as a corporate
body representing the citizens.49  On the juridical person of the state,
Vattel wrote:
A political society is a moral person (Prelim. § 2) inasmuch
as it has an understanding and a will, of which it makes use
for the conduct of its affairs, and is capable of obligations
and rights.  When, therefore, a people confer the sovereignty
on any one person, they invest him with their understanding
and will, and make over to him their obligations and rights,
so far as relates to the administration of the state, and to the
exercise of the public authority.50
The same idea of artificial moral person, separate from the
person of the ruler, whose authority to govern was given by the
aggregate of individuals it represents,51 is found in chapter four of
book one, entitled “Of the Sovereign, His Obligations, and His
Rights”:52
We have said, that the sovereignty is that public authority
which commands in civil society, and orders and directs
what each citizen is to perform, to obtain the end of its
institution.  This authority originally and essentially
belonged to the body of the society, to which each member
submitted, and ceded his natural right of conducting himself
in every thing as he pleased, according to the dictates of his
own understanding, and of doing himself justice.  But the
body of the society does not always retain in its own hands
this sovereign authority:  it frequently intrusts it to a senate,
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54. Indeed, Vattel argued that the people transferred the competence to govern
in favor of the juridical person of the state.  This is different than Rousseau’s
theory, to the effect that the people continually hold this power, crystallised in a
“volonté générale,” which must be followed by the ruler, who is merely an agent
of the people.  See J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social; ou Principes du Droit
Politique 20–22 (Marc Michel Rey 1762) and the translation J.-J. Rousseau, A
Treatise on the Social Compact; or the Principles of Political Law 20–22 (London
1764).  See also Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 22.
55. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 8:  “The fundamental regulation that
determines the manner in which the public authority is to be executed, is what
forms the constitution of the state.  In this is seen the form in which the nation acts
in quality of a body politic,—how and by whom the people are to be governed,—
and what are the rights and duties of the governors.”
56. Id. 
The Laws are regulations established by public authority, to be
observed in society.  All these ought to relate to the welfare of the state
and of the citizens.  The laws made directly with a view to the public
welfare are political laws; and in this class, those that concern the body
itself and the being of the society, the form of government, the manner
in which the public authority is to be exerted,—those, in a word, which
together form the constitution of the state, are the fundamental laws.
57. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 14–15.
58. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 15.
59. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 10–11.
60. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 17:  “As soon as a prince attacks the
constitution of the state, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the
people become free by the act of the sovereign, and can no longer view him but as
an usurper who would load them with oppression.”
This line of thought put forward by Vattel, who earlier spoke of the
governing authority as the “depositary of the empire” (see Law of Nations, supra
note 4, at 14) is analogous to Locke’s theory of government, according to which the
supreme governmental authority (i.e. the legislative power) is held in trust by those
who rule and return to the people if the trust is broken.  See J. Locke, Two Treatises
of Government 369–70 (Amen-Corner 1690):  
Though in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own Basis,
and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the
preservation of the Community, there can be but one Supreme Power,
which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be
subordinate, yet the Legislative power being only a Fiduciary Power to
act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supreme Power
to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act
or to a single person.  That senate, or that person, is then the
sovereign.53
This public authority transferred from the people to the nation54 must
be exercised according to the “Constitution,”55 which prescribes the
“fundamental laws”56 that may limit the power to govern.57  Those
laws cannot be changed by the ruler.58  Further, because the authority
to govern is rooted in the aggregate of individuals, the people can
both reform the government and change the constitution;59 it may also
rid itself of a tyrannical ruler.60
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(emphasis added) (spelling modernized).
61. See Daniel George Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic—The Law
of Nations and the Balance of Power 17 (Louisiana State University Press 1985);
Mallarmé, supra note 4, at 513:  “Mais ce souverain n’est établi que pour le bien
commun de tous les citoyens.  Il représente la Nation en ce qu’il devient le sujet où
résident les obligations et les droits relatifs à la personne morale de la société
politique; par suite, ses devoirs et ses droits sont ceux même de cette nation
concernant sa conservation et sa perfection.”
62. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 4.
63. Id. 
64. Id.  See also Francis Stephen Ruddy, International Law in the
Enlightenment—The Background of Emerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens 145–65
(Oceana Publications 1975); Mallarmé, supra note 4, at 516–33; Phillipson, supra
note 25, at 498–502.
65. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 291.
66. See Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 292.  On the administration of justice
internally, see also chapter thirteen in book one.  Id. at 77 ff.
67. See Ruddy, supra note 64, at 217, who wrote:  “With the formation of
society these rights passed from the individual to society, and in society, the right
to make war was in the sovereign . . . ”  See also Lang, supra note 61, at 18.
It follows from the incorporation of citizens into this moral
person that the primary, in fact the only, agent for securing individual
interests is the state, which thus owes its principal duty to itself, and
thereby to its people.61  Accordingly, Vattel explained that “a moral
being is charged with obligations to himself,”62 and these are
essentially “to preserve and to perfect his own nature.”63  The
preservation of a nation is its survival and that of its members; the
perfection of a nation is the happiness of its people.  He noted:
The end or object of civil society is to procure for the citizens
whatever they stand in need of for the necessities, the
conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in general,
whatever constitutes happiness,—with the peaceful
possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with
security, and, finally, a mutual defence against all external
violence.64
The idea of a moral person representing the people is also found
in book three of Droit des Gens dealing with war, which Vattel
defined as “that state in which we prosecute our right by force.”65
The natural right of individuals to use force for their personal
preservation is deemed to pass to the state, not only to administer
justice and peace between citizens within,66 but also to defend the
nation against outside threats.67  Such a transfer of power to declare
and make war appears clearly from this passage:
Thus the sovereign power alone is possessed of authority to
make war.  But, as the different rights which constitute this
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power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may be
separated or limited according to the will of the nation (Book
I. § 31 and 45), it is from the particular constitution of each
state, that we are to learn where the power resides, that is
authorized to make war in the name of the society at large.68
Also, given that a state represents its people, a declaration of war
means that not only the nations, but “all the subjects of the one are
enemies to all the subjects of the other.”69
For the present discussion, the most important feature in Vattel’s
theory is that the power to govern for the benefit of the people is
solely in the hands of this ‘moral person,’ who will exercise it both
within and without, that is, both internally on the state territory and
externally on the international plane.  He explained the exclusive
authority of the state government to represent and act on behalf of the
people:
The sovereign, or conductor of the state, thus becoming the
depositary of the obligations and rights relative to
government, in him is found the moral person, who, without
absolutely ceasing to exist in the nation, acts thenceforwards
only in him and by him.  Such is the origin of the
representative character attributed to the sovereign.  He
represents the nation in all the affairs in which he may
happen to be engaged as a sovereign.70
Accordingly, the state is the incorporated body that absorbs the
individuals that form society and represents them not only for
domestic matters, but also for matters involving foreign persons or
foreign nations.  As far as international affairs are concerned, “[t]he
sovereign state and not the individual man are henceforth the
criterion by which all relations in the international sphere are
judged.”71
Moreover, in order to assure that the incorporated body of the
nation will be the only representative of the people, both within and
without, Vattel put forward the idea of state independence, which had
already been introduced in the preface, where he wrote that “[e]ach
sovereign state claims, and actually possesses an absolute
independence on all others.”72  In the preliminaries, an analogy about
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74. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 11. 
75. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 132.
76. See Brierly, supra note 1, at 38, who opined that the system proposed by
Vattel put an “exaggerated emphasis on the independence of states.”
77. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 154–55 (emphasis added).
78. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at lv. 
independence was made between the situations of men in society and
of nations in the society of nations:
Nations being free and independent of each other, in the same
manner as men are naturally free and independent, the second
general law of their society is, that each nation should be left
in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits
from nature.  The natural society of nations cannot subsist,
unless the natural rights of each be duly respected.73
When concluding chapter three of book one, dealing with the
constitution of a nation, Vattel also made it clear that “no foreign
power has a right to interfere”74 in matters of national concern.
However, it is in the second book of Droit des Gens, entitled “Of
a Nation Considered in Its Relation to Others,”75 that this principle of
state independence was developed.76  On the international plane, it
would mean that the moral person entrusted by the people ought to
be able to govern without the interference of foreign public
authorities or individuals.  From this idea of state independence,
Vattel laid down the general rule prohibiting interference in the
internal affairs of a nation:
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence
of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think
proper, and that no state has the smallest right to interfere in
the government of another.  Of all the rights that can belong
to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and
that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to
respect, if they would not do her an injury.77
It comes out clearly from this passage that Vattel thus changed
‘sovereignty’ by associating it with ‘independence,’ which would
refer to a normative prescription according to which, on the
international plane, one state ought not to interfere in the domestic
government of another.
It is with his law of nations that Vattel completed the
externalisation of ‘sovereignty’ in Droit des Gens.  This brings back
the stated object of the treatise, which was to lay down the principles
of the law of nations “[t]o establish on a solid foundation the
obligations and rights of nations . . .”78  In the preface, Vattel had
acknowledged Hobbes as the first, to his knowledge, “who gave a
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81. See Remec, supra note 21, at 181, who wrote:  “In its external relations, by
the same reason, the state absorbs the individual men comprising it.”
82. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 3.
83. See Remec, supra note 21, at 128:   “Vattel’s aim was to establish a definite
body of laws which regulate the relations among states, laws which would subsume
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84. This is Joseph Chitty’s translation.  The original title, in French, reads:  Le
Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux
affaires des Nations et des Souverains.
85. Remec, supra note 21, at 180. 
86. Id. at 190.
distinct, though imperfect idea, of the law of nations.”79  For his part,
Vattel wrote the following:  “The Law of Nations is the science which
teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the
obligations correspondent to those rights.”80
For present purposes, suffice it to say that because the fictitious
moral person of the state has absorbed the individuals of society and
represents them on the international plane, the legal normative
scheme governing the relations involving such foreign elements is
concerned solely with the members of the society of nations, namely,
the nations.81  Here is how it would work:  “The law of nations is the
law of sovereigns; free and independent states are moral persons,
whose rights and obligations we are to establish in this treatise.”82
Thus the law of nations is a law which applies to nations, to their
mutual external relations, and to them only.83  This is something that
was already coming out clearly from the full title of Vattel’s
work—The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature,
applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns.84
In fact, as one author put it, “Vattel’s main achievement was in
outlining the sovereign state as the subject of the law of nations,”85
indeed, “the sole subjects of the law of nations.”86  It follows that the
legal system put forward in Droit des Gens to regulate the relations
between independent states constitutes the last element in order to
accomplish the externalisation of the idea of state ‘sovereignty.’
C.  Droit des Gens and territory transfers
The question of territory transfers must be appreciated in the
general context of Vattel’s work, in which ‘sovereignty’ means that
the authority to govern is vested in a political body that acts as the
sole representative of individuals in society, not only for domestic
affairs, but also for matters involving foreign nations.  In fact, the
personification of the state as the representative of an aggregate of
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(1992).
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at xiii.
89. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
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Droit naturel et souveraineté de l’Etat dans la doctrine de Vattel, 32 Archives
Philosophie Droit 71, at 73 (1987); Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 21; Lapradelle,
supra note 4, at ix–x; Brierly, supra note 1, at 39; Ruddy, supra note 64, at 140–41;
Jouannet, supra note 4, at 320 ff.
91. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 23.
92. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
individuals, which is free of outside interference or legal constraint,
constitutes the basis upon which Vattel justified the rejection of
patrimonial kingdoms, kingdoms founded on monarchical ownership
of the national territory.  This concept is at the centre of the theory
dealing with territory transfers in international law found in Droit des
Gens.
As Arthur Nussbaum pointed out, territory transfers through
treaties between state rulers remained quite common in the 18th
century:  “Treaties of the medieval type, by which a prince, in one
way or another, might dispose of his territory, are still found in this
period.”87  Vattel himself noticed that the principle of patrimonial
kingdoms, based on a proprietary right of the territory controlled by
ruler, was defended by several authors, including the German
Christian Wolff88 and the Dutch Hugo Grotius:
I know that many authors, and particularly Grotius, give long
enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties.  But the
examples often prove only the abuse of power, not the right.
And besides, the people consented to the alienation, either
willingly or by force.89
Vattel rejected this approach in the most explicit terms, as he had
already announced in the preface of Droit des Gens.90
In book one, at chapter five, entitled “Of States Elective,
Successive or Hereditary, and of those Called Patrimonial,”91 Vattel
took a firm stand against the idea that a ruler has some kind of
proprietary title over the national territory:
This pretended proprietary right attributed to princes is a
chimera, produced by an abuse which its supporters would
fain make of the laws respecting private inheritances.  The
state neither is nor can be a patrimony, since the end of
patrimony is the advantage of the possessor, whereas the
prince is established only for the advantage of the state.92
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It follows that “the care of their own safety, and the right to govern
themselves, still essentially belong to the society, although they have
intrusted them, even without any express reserve, to a monarch and
his heirs.”93
His stand on patrimonial kingdoms is intertwined with his general
theory of governance based on a ‘sovereignty’ that is unalienable,
because such authority is transferred by the people to the ruler in
order to represent them both internally and externally.  Vattel
explained his position as follows:
Every true sovereignty is in its own nature, unalienable.  We
shall be easily convinced of this, if we pay attention to the
origin and end of political society, and of the supreme
authority.  A nation becomes incorporated into a society, to
labor for the common welfare as it shall think proper, and to
live according to its own laws.  With this view it establishes
a public authority.94
As a consequence, territory transfers “can never take place without
the express and unanimous consent of the citizens, with the right of
really alienating or subjecting the state to another body politic.”95
This is because, “the individuals who have formed this society,
entered into it, in order to live in an independent state, and not under
a foreign yoke.”96  “Let us conclude then,” wrote Vattel, “that, as the
nation alone has a right to subject itself to a foreign power, the right
of really alienating the state can never belong to the sovereign, unless
it be expressly given him by the entire body of the people.”97
Chapter twenty-one of book one, entitled “Of the Alienation of
the Public Property, or the Domain, and that of a Part of the State,”98
deals specifically with the dismemberment of the state, that is, “the
cession of a town or a province that constitutes a part of it.”99  What
Vattel wrote about such transfers of some parts of the national
territory is particularly relevant for the present analysis of the cession
of Louisiana by France to the United States of America:
A nation ought to preserve itself (§ 16)—it ought to preserve
all its members—it cannot abandon them; and it is under an
engagement to support them in their rank as members of the
nation (§ 17).  It has not, then, a right to traffic with their rank
and liberty, on account of any advantages it may expect to
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derive from such a negotiation.  They have joined the society
for the purpose of being members of it—they submit to the
authority of the state, for the purpose of promoting in concert
their common welfare and safety, and not of being at its
disposal, like a farm or an [sic] herd of cattle.100
Vattel opined, however, that in extreme cases of necessity, such a
dismemberment of territory could be justified:
But the nation may lawfully abandon them in a case of
extreme necessity; and she has a right to cut them off from
the body, if the public safety requires it.  When, therefore, in
such a case, the state gives up a town or a province to a
neighbor or to a powerful enemy, the cession ought to remain
valid as to the state, since she had a right to make it: nor can
she any longer lay claim to the town or province thus
alienated, since she has relinquished every right she could
have over them.101
Accordingly, “[t]he nation ought never to abandon its members but
in a case of necessity, or with a view to the public safety, and to
preserve itself from total ruin; and the prince ought not to give them
up except for the same reasons.”102
Another relevant aspect of Vattel’s position on the cessions of
parts of the national land is the effect on the populations.  Again, his
reasoning is fundamentally linked to his theory of ‘sovereignty,’
according to which the ruler is the representative of the people:
But the province or town thus abandoned and dismembered
from the state, is not obliged to receive the new master whom
the state attempts to set over it.  Being separated from the
society of which it was a member, it resumes all its original
rights; and if it be capable of defending its liberty against the
prince who would subject it to his authority, it may lawfully
resist him.103
Thus although valid between the parties to the peace treaties, the
peoples living on the transferred territories may ignore the cession
and refuse to accept the new ruler.
It is through peace treaties that transfers of parts of the territory
are accomplished in cases of “pressing necessity, such as is produced
by the events of an unfortunate war,”104 wrote Vattel in chapter two
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of book four in Droit des Gens, entitled “Treaties of Peace.”105 It is
noteworthy, however, that Vattel further made the following
interesting point:  “[A]lienations made by the prince in order to save
the remainder of the state, are considered as approved and ratified by
the mere silence of the nation.”106  That could happen when the nation
“has not in the form of her government, retained some easy and
ordinary method of giving her express consent, and has lodged an
absolute power in the prince’s hands.”107
D.  The cession of Louisiana to the United States of America
The stand Vattel took in Droit des Gens against patrimonial
kingdoms—founded on his theory of ‘sovereignty’—dictated his
position on territory transfers.  The ruler, who represents the people,
is not generally empowered to cede territories.  In cases of state
dismemberments, Vattel is clear that the express and unanimous
consent of the individuals living in the part of the territory ceded is
required because ‘sovereignty’ belongs to the people and is thus
unalienable.  The only exception is in situations of pressing necessity
or danger to public safety (such as in the context of wars), which
validate the cession of territory as between the parties to such
treaties.  As for individuals living there, they are not bound by even
such a necessary transfer unless they consent to it, which may be
implied by their mere silence.
It is now appropriate to examine the cession of the territory of
Louisiana by France to the United States of America.  “By this act,”
wrote Floyd Shoemaker, “Napoleon Bonaparte ceded to the United
States the port of New Orleans and more than 825,000 square miles
of land west of the Mississippi, almost doubling the country’s
area.”108  The objective under this heading is to assess whether or not
the conditions for such transfers set out in Droit des Gens, which was
the dominant international law doctrine of the time in both Europe
and the United States, were met when the cession occurred.
By way of reminder, one must keep in mind that Louisiana,
which had been transferred to Spain in 1762,109 was retroceded to
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111. See Frank J. Turner, The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in
the Period of Washington and Adams, 10 Am. Hist. Rev. 249 (1905); Mildred S.
Fletcher, Louisiana as a Factor in French Diplomacy from 1763 to 1800”, 17 Miss.
Valley Hist. Rev. 367 (1905).
112. See Gene A. Smith, “To Conquer without War”:  The Philosophy of
Jeffersonian Expansion, in Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest
Destiny, 1800–1821 16 (Frank L. Owsley, Jr. & Gene A. Smith eds., University of
Alabama Press 1997), reprinted in The Louisiana Purchase and Its Aftermath,
1800–1830 (Dolores E. Labbe ed.) in 3 Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in
Louisiana History 7, 9 (University of Southwestern Louisiana 1998):   
Spain’s cession of Louisiana and the Floridas to France, Jefferson
believed, ‘works most sorely on the United States,’ because it
threatened the American right of navigation as well as the country’s
security. [ . . . ]  Before France could take possession of Louisiana, a
more critical event occurred.  On October 16, 1802, Juan Ventura
Morales, Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, closed the port to all
American commerce descending the river, blatantly violating the 1795
Pinckney Treaty.
 (footnotes omitted). 
113. Found in 56 Consolidated Treaty Series 291 (French) (Clive Parry ed,
Oceana Publications 1969) (French) (signed on March 27, 1802).
114. See generally Ronald D. Smith, Napoleon and Louisiana:  Failure of the
France in 1800 by the Treaty of San Ildefonso110 after Napoleon put
pressure on Charles IV in Madrid.111  The English informed the
Americans of the conclusion of this treaty and they became eager to
protect their interests in the area, particularly in New Orleans where
they used to have an agreement with the Spaniards for the navigation
on the Mississippi and the storage of merchandise in the port.112
Following the Peace of Amiens113 in 1802, which ended the war with
England, France was getting ready to formalise the Treaty of San
Ildefonso; in fact, a naval expedition of troops was meant to take
possession of Louisiana.114  This proved unnecessary, however, with
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Proposed Expedition to Occupy and Defend Louisiana, 1801–1803, 12 La. Hist.
21 (1971); Shoemaker, supra note 108, at 5.
115. See William M. Sloane, The World Aspects of the Louisiana Purchase, 9
Am. Hist. Rev. 507, 511–12:  
Bonaparte’s foremost thought, therefore, was for concentration of
energy.  The sea-power of the world was Britain’s, and her tyranny of
the seas without a real check; even the United States could only spit out
defiant and revengeful threats when her merchantmen were treated with
contempt on the high seas by the British men-of-war.  Therefore with
swift and comprehensive grasp he framed and announced a new policy.
The French envoy in London was informed that France was now forced
to the conquest of Europe—this of course for the stimulating of French
industries—and to the restoration of her occidental empire.  This was
most adroit. 
(emphasis added).
116. See Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana 164ff (Louisiana State
University Press 1976).
117. See also W. Edwin Hemphill, The Jeffersonian Background of the
Louisiana Purchase, 22 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 177 (1935); see generally Dumas
Malone, Jefferson and his Time, 2 vols. (Little, Brown, & Co. 1948).
118. F. Barbé-Marbois, The History of Louisiana:  Particularly of the Cession
of that Colony to the United States of America 280–81 (Louisiana State University
Press 1977).
119. Found in 57 Consolidated Treaty Series 29 (French & English) (Clive Parry
ed., Oceana Publications 1969) (signed on April 30, 1803).  Pursuant to it, France
transferred to the Unites States the territory of Louisiana, albeit undefined in the
instrument (see supra  note 108), which had been retroceded by Spain to France in
1800.  Although the agreement was negotiated in French, the articles were in both
French and English; it provided for a six-month period for ratification.  There were
Napoleon’s change of policy vis-à-vis Louisiana, which basically
meant that France was withdrawing from North America.115
It is in this context116 that Minister to France Robert Livingston
and Secretary of State James Monroe were in Paris on behalf of the
American government, empowered by President Thomas Jefferson
to settle the Mississippi question, and in particular to negociate an
agreement over the status of New Orleans.117  They were startled
when Monsieur de Talleyrand and François Barbé-Marbois,
negotiating for Napoleon, offered the whole of Louisiana:
Instead of the cession of a town and its inconsiderable
territory, a vast portion of America was in some sort offered
to the United States.  They only asked for the mere right of
navigating the Mississippi, and their sovereignty was about
to be extended over the largest rivers of the world.  They
passed over an interior frontier to carry their limits to the
great Pacific Ocean.118
Ten days later, on 30 April 1803, the Treaty between the French
Republic and the United States, concerning the Cession of
Louisiana119 was signed in Paris.  Napoleon thus accepted to sell the
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also two conventions dealing with accessory matters, such as the amount to be paid
by the United States for Louisiana.
It is worth noting that the Spaniards protested vigorously against the cession and
contended that it was in fact invalid because, inter alia, the Treaty of San Ildefonso
prohibited the subsequent transfer of Louisiana to a third party.  Not only did Carlos
IV feel double-crossed by Napoleon, but also he was most insulted because he only
learned of the cession when it became public information.  See the letter by Le
Chevalier Azara, Ambassadeur de Sa majesté Catholique pres la Republique
Française a Son Excellence le ministere des Relations Exterieures (which can be
found at the Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères— Correspondance
politique, Etats-Unis, supplement volume 8, page 5).  See also Thomas D. Clark &
John D. W. Guice, Frontiers in Conflict:  The Old Southwest, 1795–1830 41ff
(University of New Mexico Press 1989); J.W. Bradley, W.C.C. Claiborne and Spain:
Foreign Affairs under Jefferson and Madison, 1801–1811, reprinted in The Louisiana
Purchase and Its Aftermath, 1800–1830 in 3 Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series
in Louisiana History 7, 110 (University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1998).
120. On the negotiations between Livingston and Monroe, on the one hand, and
Talleyrand and Barbé-Marois, on the other, see Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas
Jefferson and the New Nation:   A Biography 745ff (Oxford University Press,
1970); see also Shoemaker, supra note 108, at 7–9.
121. See R.D. Bush, L’Abandon de la Louisiane:  The Last Days of Prefect
Laussat, 1803–1804, 8 La. Rev. 120, at 120–21 (1979):  
As Bonaparte’s envoy for the transfer ceremonies of Louisiana, Laussat
was the highest ranking French official in the colony until the
American takeover on December 20, 1803, and it was his responsibility
to close the book on this chapter in French colonial administration
before departing for Martinique in April, 1804.  During his final four
months in Louisiana, he had an opportunity to make several
observations of importance.
(footnotes omitted).
122. See Procès-verbal de reprise de possession de la Louisiane, found in the
Papers of Pierre Clément Laussat, Historic New Orleans Collection—MSS 125
(New Orleans, Nov. 30 1803).  On the approximately 600 documents contained in
the Papers of Laussat, see R D. Bush, Documents on the Louisiana Purchase:  The
Laussat Papers, 18 La. Hist. 104 (1977).
123. See Procès-verbal de prise de possession de la Louisiane, found in the
Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères—Traités, Etats-Unis, 1803 0010–16)
(New Orleans,  Dec. 20, 1803).
recently re-acquired colony for the price of 80 million French Francs
(15 million American dollars), which today amounts to over 2,5 billion
Francs (over 400 million dollars).120
In the meantime, on March 26, 1803, Prefect Pierre Clément
Laussat arrived in New Orleans to begin the reestablishment of a
French administration in Louisiana.121  On August 19, 1803, he was
informed of the French-American treaty, a copy of which he received
on October 7, 1803.  It was on November 30 that the Treaty of San
Ildefonso was executed and that France’s sovereignty over Louisiana
took over Spain’s;122 ironically, therefore, Louisiana reverted back to
the French after it had been ceded again to the Americans.  When the
retrocession actually took place,123 Prefect Laussat made a proclamation
to the Louisianans in his capacity of Commissioner to the French
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124. Quoted in Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 329 (emphasis added).
sovereign, which content is highly relevant to the present analysis and
is thus worth reproducing in full:
This mission, less agreeable to me than the one which I had
come to fulfil, however, offers me the consolation that it will be
more advantageous to you than the first could have been.  The
return of the French sovereignty will be only momentary.  The
approach of a war, which threatens the four quarters of the
world, has given a new direction to the beneficent views of
France towards Louisiana.  She has ceded it to the United
States of America.
The Treaty secures to you all the advantages and
immunities of citizens of the United States.  The particular
government, which you will select, will be adapted to your
customs, usages, climate, and opinions.
Above all, you will not fail to experience the advantages of
an upright, impartial, incorruptible justice, where the publicity
and invariable forms of the procedure, as well as the limits
carefully interposed to the arbitrary application of the laws, will
concur with the moral and national character of the judges and
juries in effectually guarantying to the citizens their property
and personal security.
The Mississippi, which washes not deserts of burning sand,
but the most extensive, the most fertile, and the most
favourably situated plains of the new world, will, at the quays
of this new Alexandria, be forthwith crowded with thousands of
vessels of all nations.
I have great pleasure, Louisianians, in opposing this picture
to the touching reproaches of having abandoned you, and to the
tender regrets, to which this indelible attachment of very many
of you to the country of your ancestors makes you give
utterance on the present occasion.  France and her government
will hear the account of these regrets with affection and
gratitude; but you will soon be convinced that they have marked
their conduct towards you by the most eminent and most
memorable of favours.
By this proceeding the French republic gives the first
example in modern times of the voluntary emancipation of a
colony;—an example of one of those colonies of which we are
delighted to find the prototype in the glorious ages of antiquity:
may a Louisianian and a Frenchman never meet now or
hereafter in any part of the world without feeling sentiments of
affection, and without being mutually disposed to call one
another brothers.124
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125. See supra notes  91–100 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
128. Quoted in F. Barbé-Marbois, supra  note 118, at 328.  See also the account
found in R. Hubert-Robert, L’Histoire merveilleuse de la Louisiane française—
Chronique des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles et de la cession aux Etats-Unis 357–58
(Maison française 1941).
Consequently, it becomes clear that the population of Louisiana
learned of the cession of their land to the United States from the
French authority and that Louisianians were not consulted neither
before or after the transfer of territory.
In assessing whether the cession of Louisiana met the conditions
set out in Droit des Gens, this is the first point to make, namely, that
the individuals living on the transferred territory did not consent to,
let alone expressly approve or ratify, the Treaty between the French
Republic and the United States, concerning the Cession of Louisiana.
One must thus reach the a priori conclusion that both France and the
United States considered Louisiana as a ‘patrimony,’ a piece of
estate, that one ruler could dispose of in favour of another without
consulting the affected population.  Of course, such a view is
irreconcilable with that defended by Vattel, to the effect that
‘sovereignty’ resides in the people and is merely transferred to the
holder of power, with the consequence that territory transfers must be
authorised by the people to be valid.125
The fact that the general principle put forward in Droit des Gens
was not followed by the French and American authorities in 1803
does not end the inquiry because Vattel also provided for an
exception in cases of extreme necessity and danger to public
security.126  The question then becomes whether or not the situation
prevailing at the time of the cession of Louisiana, especially with
respect to France (as the ceding party in the treaty), justifies the
application of the necessity exception.  Such a conclusion would relax
the requirement concerning the consent of the affected population to
one of tacit approval or ratification of the territory transfer, which
could be implied from the silence of the individuals living in the
relevant area.127
In that regard, a passage in Prefect Laussat’s address to the
Louisianians on November 30, 1803, proves most pertinent because
it refers to the strong possibility of armed conflict as the main reason
for the territory transfer.  He declared that “[t]he approach of a war,
which threatens the four quarters of the world, has given a new
direction to the beneficent views of France towards Louisiana.”128
Indeed, it was to avert a likely confrontation with England, which
was France’s continuing foe as well as the dominant naval power at
the time, that Napoleon was forced to renounce his North American
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129. See generally E. Wilson Lyon, The Man Who Sold Louisiana:  The Career
of François Barbé-Marois (University of Oklahoma Press 1974).
130. Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 261–62.
131. One author has argued that Louis-André Pichon, French chargé d’affaire
in the United States from 1801 to 1805, significantly influenced Napoleon in giving
up his aspirations of American empire.  See A.H. Bowman, Pichon, The United
States and Louisiana, 1 Diplomatic Hist. 257 (1977).
colony.  François Barbé-Marbois, France’s Minister of Public
Treasury and special negotiator for Louisiana,129 explained the
situation as follows:
Bonaparte had only a very reduced navy to oppose to the
most formidable power, that has ever had the dominion of the
ocean.  Louisiana was at the mercy of the English, who had
a naval armament in the neighbouring seas, and good
garrisons in Jamaica and the Windward Islands.  It might be
supposed that they would open the campaign by this easy
conquest, which would have silenced those voices in
parliament that were favourable to the continuance of peace.
He concluded from this state of things that it was requisite to
change without delay his policy in relation to St. Domingo,
Louisiana, and the United States.  He could not tolerate
indecision; and before the rupture was decided on, he adopted
the same course of measures, as if it had been certain.  He had
no other plan to pursue when he abandoned his views
respecting Louisiana than to prevent the loss, which France
was about sustaining, being turned to the advantage of
England.130
Barbé-Marbois related an episode that took place on 10 April
1803 where he and Admiral Denis Decrès had a meeting with
Napoleon at Saint-Cloud during which, after referring to his
discussion with Foreign Minister Talleyrand, the Premier Council
expressed his intentions to abandon Louisiana.131  He was convinced
by then of England’s naval threat in the region and of its imminent
attack on his North American colony:
The English have successively taken from France, Canada,
Cape Breton, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the richest
portions of Asia.  They are engaged in exciting troubles in St.
Domingo.  They shall not have the Mississippi which they
covet.  Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their
conquests in all parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they
feel at the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of
France, acquaints me with their wish to take possession of it,
and it is thus that they will begin the war.  They have twenty
ships of war in the gulf of Mexico, they sail over those seas
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132. Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 263–64.  The very same words
attributed to Napoleon are recorded in Hubert-Robert, supra  note 128, at 335–36
and in Shoemaker, supra note 108, at 7.
133. See B. Lugan, Histoire de la Louisiane française, 1682–1804 207(Perrin
1994):  
Barbé-Marbois était du même avis que Bonaparte.  Il lui expliqua que
les Anglais, maître du Canada, pouvaient s’emparer de la Lousiane par
le nord, à partir des Grands Lacs, alors que la France n’était pas en
mesure d’y faire passer un corps expéditionnaire susceptible de
défendre cette colonie puisque l’Angleterre était déjà quasiment
maîtresse de l’Atlantique.
134. Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 264.
135. Id. at 265.
136. Id.
137. See Sloane, supra note 115, at 512:  “The very last of his [Napoleon’s]
great constructions was the sale of Louisiana.  He needed the purchase-money, he
selected his purchaser and forced it on him, with a view to upbuilding a giant rival
to the gigantic power of Great Britain.”  See also DeConde, supra  note 116, at 164.
as sovereigns, whilst our affairs in St. Domingo have been
growing worse every day since the death of Leclerc.
The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took
the trouble to make a descent there.  I have not a moment to
lose in putting it out of their reach.  I know not whether they
are not already there.  It is their usual course, and if I had
been in their place, I would not have waited.  I wish, if there
is still time, to take from them any idea that they may have of
ever possessing that colony.  I think of ceding it to the United
States.132
Decrès did not share Napoleon’s opinion, but Barbé-Marbois did:133
“We should not hesitate to make a sacrifice of that which is about
slipping from us.  War with England is inevitable.”134  The French
Minister of Public Treasury also thought that Louisiana was, in fact,
vulnerable from all directions; he stated, “[It is vulnerable] from the
north by the great lakes, and if, to the south, they [English troops]
show themselves at the mouth of the Mississippi, New Orleans will
immediately fall into their hands.”135  In any event, concluded Barbé-
Marbois, such a conquest of Louisiana “would be still easier to the
Americans; they can reach the Mississippi by several navigable
rivers.”136
It is fair to argue, therefore, that the main motivation behind
Napoleon attitude towards his North American colony was very
much linked to power politics—To avoid a war he would lose with
the English over Louisiana, the territory had to be transferred to the
United States of America.137  This is the plan of action the Premier
Council announced to Barbé-Marbois on April 11, 1803, the day after
their meeting:  “Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season.
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138. See Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 274.
139. Id. at 275.  See also the account found in Hubert-Robert, supra note 128,
at 344, according to which Napoleon said the following:  
Que les Louisianais sachent que nous nous séparons d’eux avec regret,
que nous stipulons en leur faveur tout ce qu’ils peuvent désirer, et qu’à
l’avenir, heureux dans leur indépendance, ils se souviennent qu’ils ont
été Français, et que la France, en les cédant, leur a assuré des avantages
qu’ils n’auraient pu obtenir sous le gouvernement d’une métropole
d’Europe, quelque paternel qu’il puisse être; qu’ils conservent pour
nous des sentiments d’affection et que l’origine commune, la parenté,
le langage, les moeurs perpétuent l’amitié.
140. See Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 275.
141. For another very similar report of Napoleon’s announcement concerning
the sale of the whole of Louisiana, see Sloane, supra note 115, at 517.
142. See supra note 106–07 and accompanying text.
143. Law of Nations, supra note 4, at 432–33 (emphasis added).
144. See also Hubert-Robert, supra note 128, at 363–64.
145. Barbé-Marbois, supra note 118, at 335.
I renounce Louisiana.”138  It was thus not only New Orleans but the
whole of Louisiana that was to be transferred, a course of action
Napoleon adopted “with the greatest regrets.”139  But he went on to
say that “[t]o attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly,”140 given
the overwhelming power of the English in the region.141
Assuming that the necessity exception set out in Droit des Gens
was met because of the perceived threat to the colony of Louisiana
from the English forces, there remains the condition that the affected
population approve of the territory transfer.  In such cases of
extreme necessity or danger to public safety, Vattel watered down
the consent requirement, although there still must be at least some
kind of acquiescence, albeit silent, on the part of the people.142
Transfers of parts of the national territory, such as colonial
possessions, “in order to save the remainder of the state,” wrote the
Swiss author unambiguously, “are considered as approved and
ratified by the mere silence of the nation.”143
To help determine whether there was resistence to the cession of
Louisiana or whether the population implicitly accepted the new
sovereign power, the account by François Barbé-Marbois is again
very useful.144  He reported that in spite of all the precautions taken,
“several accidents were occasioned by the diversity of language,
usages, and habits, as well as by the regret which many felt at seeing
broken for ever the ties that had united them to another people.”145
However, the change of sovereignty that occurred for the inhabitants
of Louisiana on December 20, 1803, wrote Barbé-Marbois, was very
different than that of 1762 between France and Spain, which “had
caused such violent commotions, and led to the shedding of the
blood of the colonists, who were discontented with a new
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146. Id.
147. Id.  On the implicit consent to the cession of Louisiana by the affected
population, see also the testimony of A. Lafargue, The Louisiana Purchase:   The
French Viewpoint, 23 La. Hist. Q. 107, 111:  
I am trying to point out that from the time the Treaty of Fontainebleau
was signed in 1762 and subsequently ratified by the Treaty of Paris of
1763 to the day of the signing of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty on
April 30, 1803, any number of events occurred to show that
Louisianians had become imbued with the spirit of democratic
freedom and liberty and that the Louisiana Purchase after all was the
culminating point of attempts to establish here a system of government
which, because of its liberal character and the justice of its
institutions, would meet with the full approval of the inhabitants of the
Mississippi Valley. 
(emphasis added).
148. But see a letter by nineteen colonists to Prefect Laussat that expressed
regrets at the cession of Louisiana to the United States:  Au citoyen Laussat préfet
et commissaire pour la reprise et la remise de la Province de la Louisiane par les
colons soussignés, found in the Papers of Pierre Clément Laussat, Historic New
Orleans Collection—MSS 125).  These landowners wanted to secure their rights
and petitioned for an immediate statehood for Louisiana, for the status of official
language for French in government proceedings, as well as for the protection of
their properties and plantations, including the ownership of slaves.  It is certainly
fair to argue that this letter does not amount to much evidence of an organized
resistance on the part of the Louisianians against the transfer of their land to the
United States.
sovereignty.”146 In the 1803 case, people tacitly accepted the
territory transfer and, indeed, did not resist the new American
sovereign, and this is said to be because “[t]he treaty had only placed
Louisiana in the situation most favourable for liberty.”147
III.  CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the cession of
Louisiana to the United States did meet the conditions prescribed in
Droit des Gens for a valid transfer of territory.  Although the
individuals affected by the cession, the Louisianians, were not
consulted and did not explicitly consent to the transfer, Vattel’s
territory transfers scheme as a whole was not breached in 1803 with
the Treaty between the French Republic and the United States,
concerning the Cession of Louisiana.  Indeed, it comes out clearly
from the foregoing analysis that the situation then, with the
perceived threat of British invasion of the French colony, makes it
possible to argue in favour of the exception provided for in cases of
extreme necessity or danger to public safety.  In this context, the
consent requirement is relaxed so that the people’s silence can be
deemed enough for the necessary approval or ratification of a treaty
transferring a part of the national territory.  This is no doubt what
happened in the case of Louisiana.148
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149. See J.S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature upon International
Law in the United States, 3 Am. J. Int’l L. 547, 549:  
At the time of the American Revolution the work of Vattel was the
latest and most popular if not the most authoritative of the Continental
writers.  Citation of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel are scattered in
about equal numbers in the writings of the time.  Possibly after the
Revolution Vattel is quoted more frequently than his predecessors.  
See also F.S. Ruddy, The Acceptance of Vattel, in Grotian Society Papers 1972 —
Studies in the History of the Law of Nations 177, 179-80 (C.H. Alexandrowicz ed.,
Martinus Nijhoff 1972); de Lapradelle, supra note 4, at xxix-xxx & xxxv-xxxviii.
150. E.D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26
Am. J. Int’l L. 239, 259 n.132 (1932). 
151. See, for example, Miller v. Resolution, 2 Dollo 15 (1781); Brown v. U.S.,
8 Cranch 110 (1814).
The remaining question, most interesting on a theoretical and
historical point of view, is this—Given that Droit des Gens was
surely the dominant international law doctrine in the United States
at the time and that, as it was shown, the cession of Louisiana met
the conditions set out therein, why was Vattel not used to justify and
rationalise American sovereignty over the former French colony in
North America?  This question is certainly relevant, not least
because, on many other matters, lawyers, judges and politicians
alike regularly referred to the writing of the Swiss author at the turn
of the 19th century in the United States of America.149
As compelling evidence of the authority that Vattel enjoyed in
America, suffice it to mention the study by Edwin DeWitt
Dickinson.  He compiled the number of times European
internationalists were used before and by the Supreme Court of the
United States between 1779 and 1820, with the following results:
Eighty-two cases were found in these [seventeen] volumes
involving more or less important questions of international
law.  The figures in parentheses indicate the number of
instances in which the publicist named was cited, quoted, or
paraphrased.  Cited in argument:  Grotius (16), Pufendorf
(9), Bynkershoed (25), Burlamaqui (9), Rutherforth (18),
Vattel (92). Cited in opinion: Grotius (11), Pufendorf (4),
Bynkershoek (16), Burlamaqui (4), Rutherforth (5), Vattel
(38). Quoted or paraphrased in opinion: Grotius (2),
Bynkershoek (8), Burlamaqui (2), Rutherforth (2), Vattel
(22).150
Accordingly, Dickinson demonstrated that Vattel had a real and
comparatively great impact on American judicial decision-making
on international law issues.  It is also noteworthy that such
references to Droit des Gens were on many different international
law questions, such as the confiscation of enemy property,151 the
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152. See, for example, Handly’s Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374 (1820).
153. See, for example, U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
154. See also Jouannet, supra note 3, at 15 n.22, where the author provided a list
of subjects in which was rendered judicial or arbitrary decisions referring to
Vattel’s Droit des Gens.
155. C.G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, Part I, 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 395,
395 (1913).
156. Some contend that Vattel’s success derived, at least in part, from the many
ambiguities and inconsistencies found in his work.  See, for example, H.
Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 7 (Clarendon
Press 1933) (referring to his “elegant manner of evasion”); see also Nussbaum,
supra note 87, at 159, who spoke of “the striking ambiguity of his formulas and [...]
the inconsistency of many of his conclusions.”  See also M. Wight, Western Values
in International Relations, in Diplomatic Investigations—Essays in the Theory of
International Politics 89, 199 (H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds., Allen & Unwin
1966), who wrote that “it is part of his charm (and no doubt of his lasting influence)
that he contains inconsistent arguments that can be used to support contradictory
policies.”
157. See Remec, supra note 21, at 56, who explained:  “Vattel’s system of
international law received through this synthesis a very ‘modern form,’ primarily
because it fitted actual contemporary practice so well, which it sought to justify in
high moral terms.”  See also P.F. Butler, Legitimacy in a States-System: Vattel’s
Law of Nations, in The Reason of States—A Study in International Political Theory
45, 57 (M. Donelan ed., Allen & Unwin 1978):  
Vattel, I suggest, recognised the major components of political life that
were identified in eighteenth-century Europe:  the sovereign, the
individual, the transnational moral order, and property.  He also dealt
with these components in a way that settled their relative moral
boundary of co-riparian states,152 international commercial
matters,153 et cetera.154
The influence of Vattel, however, went considerably beyond the
judiciary and, in fact, included the legislative and executive branches
of the American government, as well as legal education and the
academe.  As Charles Fenwick succinctly explicated:
Vattel’s treatise on the law of nations was quoted by judicial
tribunals, in speeches before legislative assemblies, and in the
decrees and correspondence of executive officials.  It was the
manual of the student, the reference work of the statesman,
and the text from which the political philosopher drew
inspiration.  Publicists considered it sufficient to cite the
authority of Vattel to justify and give conclusiveness and
force to statements as to the proper conduct of a state in its
international relations.155
This achievement may only be explained by recognising that Droit
des Gens provided legal and diplomatic answers to the current
problems of international relations and governance,156 which were
along the lines of the core political principles and needs of the
time.157  “It was a ‘realistic’ book,” wrote Martti Koskenniemi,
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significance.  Acceptance of the general thrust of his arguments
contributed to the maintenance of the balance of power system.6
158. M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia—The Structure of International
Legal Argument 89 (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 1989) (emphasis added); see also
J.S. Reeves, La communauté internationale, 3 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 37–38 (1924).
159. Interestingly, in the 1878 Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine on a Question of Collective Naturalization, in A Selection of Cases and
Other Readings on the Law of Nations—Chiefly as it is interpreted and Applied by
British and American Courts 257, 258 (E.D. Dickinson ed., McGraw-Hill 1929),
the theory of territory transfers used is very reminiscent indeed of Vattel’s:  
The territory in question being acquired by treaty, the government
transferring it ceases to have any jurisdiction over it.  It no longer owes
protection to those residing upon it, and they no longer owe it
allegiance.  The inhabitants residing upon the territory transferred have
the right of election.  They may remove from the territory ceded it they
prefer the government ceding the territory.  If they elect to remain, their
allegiance is at once due to the government to which the cession has
been made, and they are entitled to the corresponding right of
protection from such government.
160. See, for example, the debate over American neutrality in the war between
France and England in the House of Representatives in 1794, recorded in the
Annals of Congress, 3rd Congress, at 754.  Likewise, see the debate on a similar
issue in 1797, recorded in the Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 2nd Session, at
2230, 2231, and 2234.
161. See the debates reported in the Annals of Congress, 8th Congress, 1st
Session.
162. But see DeConde, supra  note 116, at 186:  
Accepting the anti-Louisiana rhetoric as representing the Federalist
“especially useful for diplomats and practitioners, not least because
it seemed to offer such compelling rhetorics for the justification of
most varied kinds of State action.”158
One should ask all the more: Why was there no reference to
Vattel’s doctrine in the case of Louisiana?  The simplistic answer is
that there was no need to utilise Droit des Gens, because the cession
was not contentious in the United States.  But this argument would
explain the lack of reference to the Swiss author in judicial
proceedings,159 not in the political arena where he had frequently
been used before.160  In Congress, Vattel was not considered relevant
because of the nature of the issues that the Louisiana purchase was
deemed to raise, which had nothing to do with the international law
validity of the cession (based, in large part, on the consent of the
affected population).  Instead, the main concerns voiced and debated
before both the House of Representatives and the Senate resolved
around the American constitution.
Indeed, when President Jefferson called a special session of
Congress in October of 1803161 to ratify the Treaty between the
French Republic and the United States, concerning the Cession of
Louisiana, a resistance movement had mobilized and argued that
expansion was not authorised by the constitution of the Union.162  As
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party’s stance, scholars usually depict Federalists as political
opportunists who quickly cast aside their commitment to broad
constitutional construction just to embarrass the Jeffersonians.  By
reversing their positions on constitutional interpretation, Federalists
and Republicans both appear to have placed the practicalities of politics
ahead of consistency in principles.  Actually Federalist opponents of
the purchase, however vocal, comprised a minority, mainly from New
England, within their own party.  Most Federalists appear to have
remained faithful to their party’s earlier expansionist credo.  Like most
other Americans, they wanted Louisiana. 
(emphasis added).
163. Sloane, supra note 115, at 519.
164. It must be noted, however, that Jefferson had his reservations on whether
the Constitution allowed acquisitions of foreign territories.  See T.J. Farnham, The
Federal-State Issue and the Louisiana Purchase, 6 La. Hist. 5, 7–8 (1965).
165. Sloane, supra note 115, at 519.  Later the author wrote:  “The treaty, they
asseverated, was therefore unconstitutional and, even worse, impolitic, because we
were unfitted and did not desire to incorporate into our delicately-balanced system
peoples different in speech, faith, and customs from ourselves . . . . ”  Id.
166. See DeConde, supra note 116, at 187.  See also Farnham, supra note 164,
at 25: “Colonel Pickering and his [Federalist] apostles realized that they were in the
minority on the Louisiana question, but until the end, they refused to realize how
small their numbers actually were.”  On the seminal role of John Breckinridge,
President’s Jefferson’s leader in the Senate, in managing to pass the motions in
Congress to complete the Louisiana purchase, see L.H. Harrisson, John
Breckinridge and the Acquisition of Louisiana, 7 La. Studies 7 (1968).
167. This is not to say, however, that the will of the population affected by the
cession of Louisiana was totally discounted and ignored.  See Barbé-Marbois, supra
note 118, at 322–23:  
The senators who opposed the ratification, men deserving of esteem,
but advocates of rigorous theories, invoked in support of their argument
those maxims of universal justice, which necessity and even
expediency so often silence.  “Congress,” they said, “had not the power
of annexing by treaty new territories to the confederacy.  This right
could only belong to the whole people of the United States.”  These
senators likewise required the free acquiescence of the Louisianians.
William Sloane put it, “the vital question was whether the adjustment
of new relations was constitutional,”163 which was answered in the
affirmative by the Republicans.164  On the other side, the Federalists
were opposed to expansionism and “contended that the executive had
usurped the powers of Congress by regulating commerce with foreign
powers and by incorporating foreign soil and foreign people with the
United States.”165  In the end, the polemic proved relatively short and,
on October 26, 1803, the motion on Louisiana was approved in the
House of Representatives and, for its part, the Senate ratified, 24 to
7.166
Accordingly, it is clear that the debates in Congress on the
purchase of Louisiana centred on the legality of the transaction under
the American Constitution and that politicians were not interested in
the validity of the cession in international law.167  The principal
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“This was their natural right; and the formal consent of the two people
was,” according to them, “indispensable; namely, the consent of the
one party to belong to the Union, and that of the other to enlarge its
territory.  Neither the constitution nor any act that had emanated from
them had authorized the president to conclude such a treaty.”
(emphasis added).
object of discussion in Congress thus explains why Vattel’s writing
on territory transfers was not considered of any use at the time.  This
last element of the foregoing analysis demonstrates that Droit des
Gens—which was undoubtedly the dominant international law
doctrine in the United States then—was not ignored per se in the case
of Louisiana.  As the paper attempted to show, moreover, reference
to Vattel could have been made to justify and rationalize the transfer
in 1803 because, indeed, the conditions he prescribed for its validity
in international law were no doubt met.
